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Supporting Stabilization in Libya 
The Challenges of Finalizing and Implementing the Skhirat Agreement 
Wolfram Lacher 
Representatives of Libya’s warring parties are close to reaching a UN-mediated power-
sharing agreement that would establish a Government of National Accord (GNA). As-
suming it is finalized, the deal will be fragile. Its implementation will be fraught with 
tensions and can collapse at any moment under pressure from spoilers. Reaching a 
final agreement and implementing it will require yet stronger political and diplomatic 
efforts from external actors. This includes intensive engagement with the parties to the 
agreement and those who oppose the deal or have been left out of it; carefully wielding 
the instrument of targeted sanctions; and containing regional rivalries that have fueled 
Libya’s conflicts. International support for implementation should take into account 
not only the formal demands of a unity government but also wider Libyan sensitivities 
over external interference. A foreign military presence would undermine the agree-
ment. 
 
The UN-mediated agreement, negotiated in 
Skhirat (Morocco), seeks to end a yearlong 
civil war that caused state institutions to 
split into two. The government of Abdallah 
al-Thinni – in the eastern city of Bayda 
and recognized internationally – had been 
formed by the Tobruk-based House of Repre-
sentatives (HoR) elected in June 2014. In 
August 2014 the HoR’s adversaries had res-
urrected the HoR’s predecessor, the General 
National Congress (GNC), elected in July 
2012, and installed a rival government in 
Tripoli. Neither government has exercised 
control over the military forces in the loose 
alliances each of them has represented. 
Nor has either side been able to gain the 
upper hand militarily or politically. During 
the conflict, Libyan territory fragmented 
into a patchwork of local zones of influ-
ence, with neither side being able to 
cement its hold over entire regions. The 
attempts of both governments to seize 
control of the Central Bank, the National 
Oil Corporation (NOC) and state-owned 
investment vehicles have been in vain, 
due to Western insistence on a negotiated 
solution and a refusal to recognize newly 
appointed officials or bank accounts. As a 
result, support for the war has faded. Since 
spring 2015, some of the conflicting parties 
have come under pressure from war-weary 
communities, and escalation has given way 
to the negotiation of local ceasefire agree-
ments and tentative reconciliation initia-
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tives in western and southern Libya. This 
dynamic has been crucial for the progress 
of the UN-mediated negotiations. 
The agreement, initialed on July 11 by 
all parties except the GNC, reestablishes a 
single government headed by a Presidency 
Council including a prime minister and 
two deputies, who take their decisions in 
unanimity. The HoR remains the main 
legislative body but should facilitate the 
return of the forty-odd parliamentarians 
who have been boycotting sessions in 
Tobruk, including by considering moving 
its location and reexamining decisions 
taken in Tobruk. Major decisions in the HoR 
require a majority of 150 out of 192 mem-
bers, making it impossible for the current 
majority in the HoR to control the body. In 
addition, the parties to the agreement are 
to select 90 GNC members and 30 inde-
pendent figures to form a State Council. 
Through joint committees with the HoR, 
the State Council can weigh in on key 
appointments – such as the Central Bank 
Governor – and help draft the laws for a 
referendum on the draft constitution, as 
well as for new elections. With these elec-
tions, which are to take place within a year 
of the agreement’s adoption – or a maxi-
mum of two years, if the draft constitution 
has not been adopted within the first year – 
the return to constitutional government 
would be complete. 
Finalizing the deal will require bringing 
the GNC back on board and negotiating 
crucial annexes to the agreement, includ-
ing on the composition of the Presidency 
Council and the government, as well as 
the mode of selecting the members of the 
State Council. For the GNA to take office in 
Tripoli, ceasefire and security arrangements 
also still need to be negotiated and will be 
overseen by the Presidency Council. Finally, 
the agreement defers many contentious 
issues, including disputes over top posi-
tions in the administration, to be resolved 
by the power-sharing institutions at a later 
stage. 
A fragile deal 
The complexity of Libya’s conflicts is 
such that few observers expected the UN 
mediation efforts to succeed. Even in its 
current stage, the agreement therefore 
represents a major achievement. Neverthe-
less, its foundation is fragile: some of its 
core stakeholders have a narrow support 
base, while many parties to the conflict 
are only loosely associated with the deal, 
or are opposed to it. 
How to ensure effective representation 
of the conflicting parties was a question 
that had dogged UN mediators from the 
beginning. Neither of the two legislatures 
vying for legitimacy – the GNC and HoR – 
had broad public support. The GNC was 
widely seen as being responsible for the 
political deadlock that had led to the crisis, 
and during the war it was reduced to just 
over half of its 200 members. The HoR 
had been elected by a mere fifth of Libya’s 
electorate, then alienated large constituen-
cies with provocative decisions and was 
boycotted by around 40 to 50 of its 192 
members. The two governments, deprived 
of access to budgets and contested within 
their own political camps, had even less 
support. Moreover, both legislatures and 
governments lacked direct control over 
the military alliances with which they were 
associated. On the one hand, Operation 
Dignity – launched by General Khalifa 
Haftar in May 2014 as a campaign against 
Islamist militias in Benghazi – started out 
in explicit rebellion to the army leadership. 
Following the June 2014 elections, the HoR 
backed Operation Dignity and its leaders, 
though chains of military command have 
remained disjointed and outside the con-
trol of the HoR or its government. On the 
other hand, Libya Dawn was a coalition of 
militias from mostly western Libyan cities, 
including some Islamist-leaning forces, 
which took control of Tripoli in mid-2014, 
claiming to be defending the 2011 revolu-
tion against the return of former regime 
elements. Dawn lacked a clearly identifia-
ble leadership and was only nominally loyal 
to the GNC and its government. 
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Compounding these difficulties, alli-
ances on both sides have turned out to be 
fractious and fluid. As the conflict has worn 
on, both camps have witnessed increasing 
internal tensions and differentiation – to 
the extent that now the struggle is not be-
tween two camps but between dozens of 
rival political interests. The UN-led process 
has contributed to the splintering of alli-
ances by forcing political actors to position 
themselves toward the negotiations and 
encouraging representatives of local coun-
cils and armed groups to speak for them-
selves, rather than have the two legislatures 
represent them. 
Libya Dawn no longer exists. Many of its 
local constituencies have opted to support 
the negotiations and have sought to nego-
tiate ceasefires with forces from other 
cities. Misrata’s leading political represent-
atives and armed groups – previously the 
heavyweights within the Dawn alliance – 
have distanced themselves from the Islam-
ist militia leaders and revolutionary hard-
liners at the core of Libya Dawn. When 
Misratan forces began confronting the 
Islamic State (IS) in Sirte in February 2015, 
they diverged with Dawn strategists over 
military priorities and began negotiating 
ceasefires with their adversaries in War-
shafana and Zintan. Other cities previously 
backing Dawn, such as Gharyan, have en-
tered into similar agreements. The Amazigh 
towns in the Nafusa mountains had ini-
tially contributed to Dawn firepower, but 
starting in early 2015 they became increas-
ingly disengaged from the conflict and posi-
tioned themselves as neutral. There now 
remains the core group of former Dawn 
ringleaders who are holding out in Tripoli: 
Islamist politicians associated with the 
Mufti and the former Libyan Islamic Fight-
ing Group, as well as a handful of militia 
leaders from Misrata, Zawiya and Tripoli, 
who have formed the so-called Steadfast-
ness Front. This core group also exercises 
disproportionate influence in the GNC and 
was decisive in dissuading the GNC from 
initialing the agreement. During the nego-
tiations, divisions appeared not only in the 
GNC; HoR boycotters – though broadly in 
the same camp as the GNC delegation – 
have pursued their own interests and have 
not acted as one group either. 
Dawn’s adversaries have also been in-
creasingly divided. Despite becoming top 
military commander in March 2015, Haftar 
never succeeded in bringing the military 
forces in the HoR camp under his control. 
His self-styled “Libyan National Army” (LNA) 
derives its clout from its air force, as well 
as Haftar’s access to backing from regional 
states, particularly Egypt. However, key 
army units in Benghazi and eastern Libya 
have escaped Haftar’s sway, and their 
leaders have fiercely and openly opposed 
Haftar. In Tripolitania, only some factions 
within the alliance fighting against Dawn 
have adhered to the LNA; most forces in 
Zintan and Warshafana – and particularly 
those that have negotiated ceasefires with 
their adversaries – submit to local decision-
making structures. The same goes for arm-
ed groups of the Tubu ethnic minority, 
the principal HoR-aligned constituency in 
southern Libya. Leading political figures 
in the HoR camp have engaged in serious 
rivalries, even leading to an attack on Prime 
Minister al-Thinni in Tobruk, in May 2015. 
The UN-led mediation has responded to 
the fragmentation of Libya’s political scene 
by convening multiple “tracks” of dialogue. 
The agreement is the outcome of negotia-
tions in the political track that included 
representatives of the HoR, the GNC and 
parliamentarians boycotting either body, 
as well as several independent figures. In 
parallel, another track has brought togeth-
er representatives of municipal councils, 
and yet another forum convened represent-
atives of political parties and civil society, 
chiefly to gain their support for the process 
without according them formal influence 
on the outcome of negotiations. Attempts 
to organize meetings of tribal leaders were 
unsuccessful. The crucial track assembling 
representatives of armed groups for talks 
on security arrangements has yet to gather 
momentum. According to the agreement, 
this track is to serve as the forum for nego-
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tiating security arrangements until the 
GNA takes office. 
Yet, despite the mediators’ attempts to 
assemble a broad array of stakeholders, 
support for the agreement rests on a nar-
row foundation. Several of the parliamen-
tarians most strongly espousing the agree-
ment have alienated their bases, as they 
appeared to pursue above all their personal 
ambitions in negotiating the government 
lineup. The independent figures backing 
the deal were picked arbitrarily by the 
mediators, and in many cases they lack a 
political power base. Representatives of po-
litical parties and municipalities have lent 
their weight to the process, even signing 
the agreement as witnesses to compensate 
for the GNC’s absence, but have gained few 
tangible benefits from the deal. A range of 
military leaders have engaged in the track 
on security arrangements, but they have 
often done so separately and in rivalry – 
rather than coordination – with their con-
stituencies’ political representatives. Given 
the multitude of competing interest groups 
and the absence of organized political 
forces, a power-sharing agreement that is 
centered on the distribution of government 
portfolios will produce much discontent. 
Potential spoilers and the risk 
of backlash 
Although Libya’s silent majority undoubt-
edly welcomes the agreement, there is a 
long list of political actors who have a clear 
interest in its collapse, or at least have felt 
insufficiently included in the negotiations. 
As the two alliances have disintegrated, 
the emergence of a centrist coalition in sup-
port of the deal has isolated hardliners on 
both sides, who are now potential spoilers. 
In the HoR camp, this applies most promi-
nently to Haftar and the forces directly 
associated with him. With his controversial 
track record and barely veiled ambitions to 
rule the country, Haftar is unacceptable 
to the former Dawn supporters. The Presi-
dency Council is set to enter into conflict 
with Haftar as it exercises its capacity as 
commander-in-chief and is likely to dismiss 
him. With almost half of active HoR mem-
bers having opposed Haftar’s appointment 
as top army commander, the majority in a 
reunited HoR would back his removal. 
In opposing the agreement, Haftar could 
align himself with two other disgruntled 
groups. First, senior figures in the former 
regime and its security apparatus had 
worked in tandem with Haftar, hoping for 
a comeback if Dawn were defeated. The 
agreement will now close the political scene 
again to former core regime elements, who 
could try to provoke the collapse of cease-
fires in Tripolitania by activating local fac-
tions in Haftar’s LNA. Second, proponents 
of eastern Libyan autonomy had subdued 
their activism while the HoR was based in 
Tobruk and its government resided in 
Bayda, as eastern politicians exerted dis-
proportionate influence in both bodies. In 
a unity government in Tripoli, their sway 
will be greatly diminished. Eastern parlia-
mentarians had generally adopted a hard 
line toward the negotiations. Taken togeth-
er, this raises the risk of tenacious opposi-
tion to the GNA from eastern Libya. A group 
of eastern HoR members may even reject 
the deal and throw in their lot with the 
autonomy movement and Haftar to estab-
lish a parallel administration in the east. 
Hardliners on the other side of the divide 
will also pose an obstacle. This includes po-
liticians and militia leaders who had been 
prominent in Libya Dawn’s operations and 
who have consistently rejected all compro-
mise. Even if a majority in the GNC ends up 
signing the agreement, such hardliners are 
likely to remain adamant. They have to fear 
not only political marginalization but also 
possible prosecution if a unity government 
cements its authority. Their nuisance po-
tential is greatest in and around Tripoli, 
where they could pose a direct threat to 
the security arrangements required for the 
unity government to operate. Meanwhile, 
the conflict in Benghazi is set to continue 
despite the deal. Compared to western 
Libya, the lines of conflict in Benghazi are 
much more clearly delineated by ideology, 
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and the prospects for a negotiated solution 
are slim. The local warring factions include 
Islamist and jihadi groups that had been 
loosely allied with Dawn but are not party 
to the agreement. 
In addition to forces with a direct inter-
est in the agreement’s collapse, there are 
important groups with insufficient stakes 
in the deal. The Amazigh and Tubu minor-
ities, both of which can field substantial 
military forces, have repeatedly complained 
about inadequate representation at the ne-
gotiations, and support for the agreement 
is weak among both groups. Communities 
that are militarily weak and had sought to 
keep out of the conflicts of the past year, 
most notably Bani Walid, are frustrated 
over what they see as a deal rewarding the 
warlords. These groups would be unlikely 
to protect the agreement if spoilers were to 
try and force its failure. 
Finally, the group most clearly opposed 
to this or any other agreement between 
Libya’s political forces – and firmly situated 
outside all political camps – is the Islamic 
State. IS affiliates in Darna, Benghazi and 
Sirte have rapidly expanded over the past 
year of civil war. In Sirte, IS has been able to 
mobilize in a city where a sense of humilia-
tion and defeat has been widespread since 
the 2011 revolution. IS will likely seek to 
replicate this model in similar communi-
ties across Libya – such as Bani Walid – that 
have not been stakeholders in the UN-led 
negotiations and may perceive the agree-
ment as excluding them yet again from the 
political scene. A continued expansion of IS 
would severely undermine the credibility of 
the unity government, which many Libyans 
will measure first and foremost by its prog-
ress in dealing with security challenges. 
Implementing the agreement 
If the agreement is finalized, the power 
struggles that gave rise to the war will play 
out within the new power-sharing institu-
tions. This means that implementation will 
be difficult and volatile. Given the range of 
potential spoilers, a relapse into open 
conflict will remain a serious risk. 
The most immediate challenge for im-
plementation will be the negotiation and 
establishment of security arrangements – 
first in the capital, and then for vital infra-
structure across Libyan territory. A major 
shortcoming of the agreement is that it has 
left the terms of the ceasefire and security 
arrangements almost completely open. 
As the negotiations over security arrange-
ments are set to take place within the 
framework of the track bringing together 
representatives of armed groups, the par-
ties to the security arrangements will not 
have formal influence over the outcome of 
the political track. This raises the difficulty 
of how to ensure their commitment to the 
political agreement. 
The security arrangements need to fit 
two seemingly contradictory constraints. 
On the one hand, they require a deal be-
tween key military players in and around 
the capital that will almost certainly in-
clude carving up Tripoli into spheres of 
influence by previously warring parties. 
This would notably entail the return of 
Zintani forces to southern Tripoli – after 
having been driven out by Libya Dawn in 
mid-2014 – but possibly also a confronta-
tion with Tripoli-based forces that reject 
such an arrangement. On the other hand, 
the GNA and other state institutions in 
Tripoli would urgently require protection 
from loyal forces to prevent a recurrence of 
the constant extortion by armed factions 
that haunted transitional governments in 
the 2012–2014 period. Therefore, security 
arrangements need to provide for a rapid 
move away from a militia oligopoly toward 
the establishment of an integrated and neu-
tral force, into which parts of these militias 
would be dissolved. A neutral force in the 
capital could then become the nucleus of a 
regular army whose reach would expand 
gradually as local factions agree to disband 
and join. In the process, another difficulty 
will be preventing the reestablishment 
of competing chains of command, as in 
2013/14, when senior figures in the govern-
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ment and the GNC used their prerogatives 
to sponsor rival units that eventually be-
came warring parties. Even in the best case, 
however, armed groups representing par-
ticular political interests are so entrenched 
that they are certain to pose a challenge to 
state authority, even after the GNA hands 
over to an elected government. 
An instant obstacle to implementation 
will be resistance from actors who fear 
prosecution for crimes committed during 
the 2014/15 civil war. The thorny issue of 
whether and when such figures should be 
held accountable for their actions will be 
high on the political agenda. In the medi-
um term, the prosecution of war crimes 
will be crucial to permit reconciliation. In 
the short term, it is not realistic – Libya’s 
judicial system has collapsed – nor would it 
facilitate the implementation of the agree-
ment. Indeed, negotiating safe conduct and 
offering suspects a way out, such as through 
postings to embassies abroad, may be un-
avoidable in order to defuse their nuisance 
potential. 
A litmus test is whether the HoR will 
reconsider its location and the decisions it 
passed while meeting in Tobruk, thereby 
allowing HoR boycotters to join. A reuni-
fication would produce a parliament with 
a more centrist majority, reducing the risk 
that the HoR will provoke confrontations, 
or refuse to cooperate, with the Presidency 
Council or the State Council. Ultimately, 
such cooperation will be essential to permit 
the constitutional referendum and new 
elections to proceed. 
If the GNA surmounts the obstacles 
posed by armed groups and power strug-
gles, the economy could turn out to be a 
stumbling block. In 2014 alone, Libya 
burned through a quarter of its foreign 
exchange reserves, which by January 2015 
stood at $76 billion. With oil production 
remaining low due to insecurity and con-
flict, and with international oil prices plum-
meting, the GNA could face state bankrupt-
cy by mid-2016. These unprecedented fiscal 
constraints come at a time of heightened 
demands on government spending due to 
the plunge of the Libyan dinar, as well 
as the need to accommodate political and 
military factions with government budgets 
and salaries to cement the agreement. The 
GNA would urgently need oil production to 
recover, which further increases the lever-
age of armed groups that are able to shut 
down oilfields or export terminals to pro-
mote their demands. Therefore, the GNA 
would not only risk emulating past govern-
ments in their failure to revive public in-
vestment, but it could also face a fatal 
socioeconomic and political crisis if it is 
forced to make cuts in salary or subsidy 
budgets. 
What role for international 
support? 
To recapitulate: a unity government, if 
formed under a final agreement, will rely 
on a fragile agreement and a narrow sup-
port base. It will be besieged by potential 
spoilers and face tight limits to its author-
ity. Can international support salvage it? 
Among Western governments, the EU 
and the UN, there is an understandable 
tendency to plan for a substantial interna-
tional role in Libya to support the agree-
ment’s implementation. Many now con-
sider the discreet approach adopted after 
the 2011 war to have been a mistake. How-
ever, Libya’s transition did not fail because 
of the lack of Western support. Such sup-
port was offered but proved ineffective 
because of the power struggles paralyzing 
the transitional government. The Libyan 
authorities at the time rejected any talk of 
a foreign peacekeeping presence. Foreign 
policy-makers recognized that a prominent 
external role would be perceived in Libya 
as intrusive and end up undermining the 
transition process. 
Much the same is true today. Although 
there is a clear need for an external role in 
guaranteeing the agreement and arbitrat-
ing between its parties, external actors 
should be acutely alert to the risk that their 
well-meant support could become a liabil-
ity. Though any international assistance 
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would respond to a formal request by the 
GNA, it could nevertheless backfire. 
In the domain of security, two main 
types of foreign support are conceivable. 
First, there is a clear need for a neutral – 
and therefore external – party to help 
monitor the implementation of ceasefire 
and security arrangements. Second, Wes-
tern governments and the UN could push 
for an international force to guarantee 
security arrangements in Tripoli, intervene 
in the event of a ceasefire breakdown and 
protect diplomatic missions. This second 
option would be risky and counterproduc-
tive under most circumstances. 
Suspicion of foreign conspiracies runs 
high in Libya and can easily be harnessed 
by opponents of the agreement. Any pres-
ence of foreign troops, even if based outside 
Libyan territory as a rapid intervention 
force, would open the door to allegations 
that the agreement is the first step toward 
Libya’s occupation by foreign powers and 
allow spoilers to deride the government as 
a Western puppet. A foreign military pres-
ence would therefore quickly become the 
subject of political controversy, damaging 
both the GNA’s standing and the imple-
mentation of the agreement as a whole. It 
would also become a target for extremist 
groups and rogue militias, meaning that an 
international presence could not be a mere 
peacekeeping force but would have to be 
equipped to engage in heavy fighting, 
which, in turn, could trigger unintended 
consequences. An additional challenge 
would be identifying suitable troop-con-
tributing countries for such an operation. 
Troops from European states with interests 
in Libya would be perceived as evidence of 
a neocolonial project. Within the region, 
Morocco is the only supplier of interna-
tional peacekeepers that is not perceived to 
be meddling in Libya’s conflicts. Among 
the large contributors to UN peacekeeping 
contingents, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis 
are known to Libyans as migrant laborers 
and unlikely to be greeted with respect. The 
same goes for sub-Saharan African soldiers. 
Consequently, neither a full-blown 
peacekeeping operation nor an interna-
tional force to protect the diplomatic 
presence are advisable – even if the GNA 
agreed to the deployment of such a force, 
which is unlikely. The absence of such a 
force will restrain external actors in their 
ability to provide support to the GNA, due 
to security concerns. It will also complicate 
the task of international monitoring. The 
GNA could request external support in 
monitoring ceasefire and security arrange-
ments but will be reluctant to agree to any 
kind of an international protection force. 
Without external protection, however, it 
would be difficult for unarmed military 
observers to carry out their mission. In 
any case, such a force should be kept at an 
absolute minimum and would not remove 
international observers’ reliance on Libyan 
structures. 
Since external actors will have limited 
ability to back up security arrangements 
under these circumstances, such arrange-
ments need to be based on a balance of 
power between the Libyan parties. This 
entails creating structures led by military 
figures who are respected by all sides, in 
which formerly warring forces are closely 
integrated. This can only work if neutral 
units act as guarantors. External actors’ 
interlocutors for security arrangements 
have to date been largely confined to the 
former conflicting parties. Much stronger 
engagement is needed with neutral forces – 
units that were not involved in the war, 
including certain units from Tripoli or 
from Amazigh towns. 
Western governments will be particular-
ly eager to provide support in the areas of 
counter-terrorism and the control of irreg-
ular migrant flows. After all, much of the 
diplomatic momentum in support of the 
negotiations developed as European policy-
makers were desperately looking for ap-
proaches and Libyan partners in both 
domains. However, external actors should 
tread particularly cautiously in pursuing 
these interests. Establishing centralized 
command structures and overcoming fac-
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tionalism in the security sector will take 
time, but they are crucial prerequisites for 
supporting operations against extremist 
groups. External actors need to be certain 
that the units conducting such operations 
are not partisan and will not become en-
tangled in local conflicts. Contrary to 
fighting the Islamic State and other jihadi 
groups, control of migratory flows will not 
be a GNA priority. Should Europeans push 
the GNA to move against migrant smug-
glers – or even act on Libyan territory them-
selves – this risks undermining the GNA 
and the agreement on which it is based. 
In sum, though external assistance in 
the domain of security is sorely needed, 
it faces tight constraints if it is to avoid 
damaging the fragile deal. It is even more 
important for European governments and 
the EU to maintain their political commit-
ment to reach a final agreement and sup-
port its implementation, in close coordina-
tion with the UN. This includes constant 
and intensive engagement with the parties 
to the agreement, as well as potential spoi-
lers, particularly communities that have to 
date been insufficiently taken into account 
by the mediators. Targeted sanctions – 
travel bans and asset freezes – are among 
the few instruments available to foreign 
policy-makers to exert direct influence. In 
order to remain effective, the threat needs 
to be realized at some point, possibly at the 
EU and US level if consensus at the UN 
Security Council is lacking. Nevertheless, 
there can be no illusions over the limited 
(and possibly counterproductive) impact 
that targeted sanctions would have on 
many players in the conflict. 
Persistent diplomatic efforts are also 
needed to prevent regional rivalries from 
spoiling the deal. Any evidence that re-
gional governments are continuing to sup-
port spoilers in Libya should trigger high-
level diplomatic activity and, if need be, 
open naming and shaming of violators of 
the UN arms embargo on Libya. 
Finally, external actors could have a role 
to play in building trust between political 
interests by attenuating rivalries over the 
ultimate object of the past year’s conflicts, 
namely state finances and assets. Embez-
zlement of state funds by political actors 
became systemic even before the most 
recent war, when it acquired yet greater 
importance to fund the war effort. Support-
ing the Central Bank with an independent 
monitoring mechanism could help reunify 
and reestablish trust in the institution, 
provided the GNA requests such a mecha-
nism. 
In case of failure 
Should the agreement collapse and Libya 
slide back into chaos or another war, there 
is no Plan B. An international military oper-
ation to prop up the GNA or separate the 
warring parties would be certain to fail, 
given the multitude of armed factions and 
the negative reaction that foreign forces 
would trigger. The international focus 
should then shift to a containment strate-
gy, including increased efforts to enforce 
the arms embargo and dissuade regional 
powers from fueling the conflict. Even so, 
pressure on Western and regional govern-
ments to act on perceived threats from 
Libya, such as the jihadist presence, would 
increase in such a scenario, making tar-
geted or temporary military operations 
likely. The prospects for reestablishing a 
political basis for conflict resolution would 
then be even slimmer, as neither the GNC 
nor the HoR could credibly act as negotiat-
ing parties in the event of another break-
down. This grim outlook only underlines 
the imperative of finding the best possible 
approaches to support the implementation 
of the Skhirat agreement. 
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